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Explanations of the importance of Allied air power during World War II often look to the 
supporting military theorists such as Gen. William L. Mitchell and Marshal Hugh Trenchard 
to explain the rhetoric, if not the reality, of the air campaign. These theorists and their 
military acolytes undoubtedly had a significant impact on the deployment of air power, but 
they had much less to say on its use as a diplomatic tool. Study of both Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and Winston S. Churchill demonstrates that they had a sophisticated appreciation of how to 
use air power to achieve their foreign policy goals within the realm of personal diplomacy. 
For both Roosevelt and Churchill, the origin of this appreciation lay in their early experiences 
of political office and particularly in their exposure to the work of naval strategist Capt. 
Alfred T. Mahan. As wartime national leaders, both came to share a discourse of personal air 
power diplomacy acting to simultaneously refine, challenge and reinforce each other’s 
conceptions. Viewed in this light, clear Anglo-American fields of cooperation in deterrence, 
coercion, persuasion and moral diplomacy emerge. Closer examination of this Anglo-
American discourse and exchange adds to our understanding of the role of personal air power 
diplomacy at the national level in this era. It also brings into relief both the consensus and 
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tensions surrounding air power within the Anglo-American wartime alliance. Ultimately, it 
suggests that there was a good deal of continuity in the personal air power diplomacy of both 
leaders as they strove to integrate atomic weapons into their calculations and confronted the 
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Power on the international stage can encompass everything from the waging of total 
war to the ability to achieve diplomatic influence. As John Ferris has suggested, it is a 
complex amalgam of material strength, administrative capacity to organise and perception, 
both foreign and domestic. Air forces, as generators of power, can be impressive but are 
expensive and reliant on advanced industries.1 Technological advances brought great strides 
in the military capabilities and effectiveness of aircraft by the 1940s, but these advances and 
the debates surrounding them can both draw our attention and cloud our understanding of 
aviation’s contribution to the diplomacy of the era. Britain and the United States used the 
construction of vast air forces during World War II to provide the military power to achieve 
                                                          
1 John Ferris, ‘Power, Strategy, Armed Forces and War,’ in Patrick Finney ed., International History, New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 61 and 63. 
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victory, but also to provide the diplomatic power to influence each other, allied nations and 
the enemy. Modern aircraft created another dimension in which diplomatic influence could 
operate. At the same time, personal diplomacy gained new prominence. National leaders 
increasingly circumvented or superimposed their interventions on the traditional arena of 
ambassadors, diplomatic staff and ministers. Neville Chamberlain famously conducted 
personal summitry with Adolf Hitler in the shadow of the bomber in 1938, but it was with 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill that an Anglo-American personal diplomacy 
developed fully to encompass not just their meetings but day-to-day discussions and contacts. 
The close friendship of Roosevelt and Churchill has received a good deal of attention from 
scholars, but its significance went beyond being the glue that held the Anglo-American 
alliance together to achieve victory.2 It provided a stage for shared dialogue and exchange of 
diplomatic influence in the world. Both believed key individuals could shape international 
relations and saw air power as one tool to deter, coerce and persuade others while being a 
moral force to justify their actions.3  
 
The British and Americans looked upon the costly land battles of World War I with horror 
and as something never to repeat. For this reason, they demonstrated a good deal of interest in 
the disarmament process during the 1920s and early 1930s. At Washington in 1922 and then 
London in 1930, they succeeded in placing controls on naval weapons. They were less 
successful with military aircraft, but the Anglo-American hope was that disarmament might 
draw the tension from international relations. This hope proved illusory as the British first in 
1934 and then the Americans in 1938 came to believe that they could only achieve security 
                                                          
2 For example see Warren F. Kimball, Forged in War – Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War New 
York, Harper Collins, 1997 and Jon Meacham, Franklin and Winston – A Portrait of a Friendship London, 
Granta Books, 2004. 
3 Steve Marsh discusses Churchill’s need to find a stage for personal diplomacy in ‘Personal Diplomacy at the 
Summit,’ in Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh eds., Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship, 
Abingdon, Routledge, 2017, 116. 
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with adequate military forces. Moral force transformed from a willingness to disarm to the 
possession of powerful air forces during the 1930s, though the British and Americans arrived 
at this conclusion from slightly different directions. For the British facing the rearmament of 
Germany, the fear was of an unprepared nation suffering a devastating ‘knock out’ blow. It 
would appear foolhardy not to prepare an equally devastating counter-blow for deterrence or 
potential use. The US faced no such threat from any country. The idea of geographic security 
underpinned by ideas of neutrality and isolation was still powerful with many Americans. 
Offensive aerial operations were difficult to justify in such a climate and so a defensive 
reliance on aircraft technology to maintain national security became an important moral 
justification for American air power.4 As both nations entered World War II, aircraft as a 
technological approach to preventing or limiting the impact of the war appealed. True, an air 
war could be potentially devastating, but it was ultimately preferable to the much greater 
anticipated carnage of a land war. 
 
With the Germans on their doorstep, the British reached the conclusion by 1934 that 
rearmament was essential for their security. In the US, Roosevelt continued to hope for 
international cooperation that would limit the effects of aerial bombing if war broke out in 
Europe. Facing an increasingly threatening international situation, he mentioned the 
maintenance of ‘international morality’ eight times in his famous ‘Quarantine’ speech in 
October 1937.5 A year later he wrote to Hitler during the Munich Crisis appealing for him to 
                                                          
4 On the origins of air power doctrine see Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgement – American Bombing in World 
War II Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985, Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power – The 
Creation of Armageddon New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987 and Craig F. Morris, The Origins of 
American Strategic Bombing Theory Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2017. On the combination of 
technological advance and morality, see Mark Clodfelter, Beneficial Bombing – The Progressive 
Foundations of American Air Power, 1917-1945 Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2011.  
5 Roosevelt, Address at Chicago October 5, 1937. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/208843 accessed October 20 2019. 
5 
 
use ‘pacific methods’ and avoid ‘the use of force.’6 This hope eventually ‘faded’ and by 
1938, Roosevelt advocated a serious American Air Force.7 Yet, he also maintained a belief in 
the moral power of his former position. As Europe descended into war once more, Roosevelt 
appealed to all sides to avoid the ‘inhuman barbarism’ of ‘bombardment from the air of 
civilian populations or of unfortified cities.’8 The British and French replied that they 
intended to spare civilian populations and cultural property while the Germans welcomed the 
President’s appeal and advised they had orders only to attack military targets.9 Roosevelt 
continued in his search for peace at least until the spring of 1940 sending his Undersecretary 
of State, Sumner Welles on a peace mission to Europe in February 1940 and writing to both 
Hitler and Mussolini in April 1940 requesting they undertake not to use their armed forces to 
‘attack or invade’ thirty-two listed countries. The aims of the Welles mission and the appeal 
were perhaps a last attempt to maintain the uneasy peace of the ‘Phony War’ and possibly 
Italian neutrality, but they also distinguished the Axis powers in moral terms.10 Roosevelt’s 
‘Four Freedoms’ speech of January 1941 setting out essential human conditions in world 
terms (speech, religion, want and fear) and the later joint ‘Atlantic Charter’ of August 1941 
did much to ideologically unify Britain and the US and cement the moral power of the force 
they would eventually deploy as allies in war.11 
                                                          
6 Roosevelt, Letter to Adolf Hitler September 27, 1938 Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209205 accessed October 20, 2019. 
7 Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare – The Evolution of British and American Ideas about 
Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002, 203. 
8 Roosevelt, An Appeal to Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Poland September 1, 1939. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209957 accessed October 20, 2019. 
9 Biddle, Rhetoric, 182. 
10 J. Simon Rofe, Franklin Roosevelt’s Foreign Policy and the Welles Mission New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007, 2. Roosevelt, Message to Hitler and Mussolini April 14, 1939. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209511 accessed October 
20, 2019. 
11 Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union January 6, 1941 Online by Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209473 and the 
‘Atlantic Charter’ August 14, 1941 
https://www.fdrlibrary.org/documents/356632/390886/atlantic_charter.pdf/30b3c906-e448-4192-8657-




Both Churchill and Roosevelt were very clear on the importance of air power for eventual 
victory in World War II. Of the two, Churchill had the closer experience of its military 
potential. During his time as Secretary of State for Air from 1919 to 1921, the air power 
theorist and ‘father’ of the Royal Air Force Hugh Trenchard was Chief of the Air Staff. His 
early influence was evident in Churchill’s plan, as Minister for Munitions, for a thousand-
bomber raid on Berlin in 1919. The idea clearly stayed with Churchill, writing in 1925 he 
noted ‘The campaign of 1919 was never fought; but its ideas go moving along.’12 During 
World War II, the British aerial war effort would go on to consume nearly half their total war 
expenses with Bomber Command devouring a third.13 Although Trenchard experienced less 
favour from the Chamberlain administration, who offered him a training post in Canada, with 
Churchill’s assumption of power in May 1940 he received several offers of high-level 
military commands. He rejected them all and while there were certainly tensions with 
Churchill, he remained on good terms and eventually became an ‘unofficial’ inspector of the 
RAF writing several key wartime reports. Trenchard had Churchill’s ear when it came to 
developing military policy, but as he recognised himself, diplomacy was not high on his list 
of personal skills, nor the focus of his writing and speaking on the subject of air power.14  
 
Roosevelt placed a similar emphasis on air power as a key component of victory. In May 
1941, before the United States had even entered the war he declared ‘command of the air by 
the democracies must and can be achieved. Every month the democracies are gaining in the 
relative strength of the air forces. We must see to it that the process is hastened and that the 
                                                          
12 Jorg Friedrich, The Fire  The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945 New York, Columbia University Press, 2006, 
51. 
13 Friedrich, The Fire, 18 and 75. 
14 On Churchill’s relationship with Trenchard see Vincent Orange, Churchill and His Airmen – Relationships, 
Intrigue and Policy Making, 1914-1945 London, Grub Street, 2013 and Russell Miller, Boom – The Life of 
Viscount Trenchard, Father of the Royal Air Force, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2016. 
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democratic superiority in the air be made absolute.’15 After later agreeing upon a program to 
construct 82,000 combat planes, he wrote to Churchill in November 1941 that ‘there have 
been misgivings in some quarters about the size of this program. I have none. We simply 
must get a complete domination of the air next year, even though other important things give 
way.’16 Whilst not reaching quite the same proportion of expenditure during World War II as 
the British, the Americans still managed to spend a healthy 35% of their total war expenses 
on their air force.17 
 
Roosevelt was certainly familiar with the contemporary American doctrines of air power. 
These were very broad definitions describing the ability of nations to project national power 
via military aircraft and ancillary forces to contribute to victory in war and conflict. The 
military acolytes of air power prophet Gen. William Mitchell undoubtedly had the president’s 
ear and saw the potential for their theories to be writ large on a global war. Yet to focus on 
the military is to miss the subtlety of Roosevelt in the diplomatic and political sphere. He did 
not consider fighting the war his job and was largely prepared to let his military prosecute it. 
Instead, grand strategy and diplomacy drew his attention as subjects that had a much deeper 
personal heritage and appeal. Immersed in the thinking of naval strategist Capt. Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, he recognised that air power’s diplomatic potential transcended Mitchell’s 
rather limited military vision.  
 
Historians often described Roosevelt, because of his service as Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy in the Wilson administration and clear enthusiasm for all things nautical, as being a 
                                                          
15 Roosevelt, Memorandum to the Secretary of War Ordering the Construction of Heavy Bombers May 5, 1941 
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209565  accessed October 20, 2019. 
16 Roosevelt to Churchill November 30, 1942 Kimball, Correspondence II, 41. 
17 Friedrich, The Fire, 18. 
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Navy man through and through.18 Others, however, to a greater or lesser degree picture him 
as a disciple of air power prophet Mitchell.19 Roosevelt invited the outspoken air prophet to 
appear before the Navy General Board in March 1919, but he toed the Navy line that became 
more hostile to Mitchell as the latter increased his accusations and demonstrations of Naval 
incompetence in the face of air power.20 Roosevelt spoke up for aviation and had certainly 
encountered it a great deal during the recent war, but he still viewed aviation as an ‘adjunct’ 
that ‘might’ make surface ships impossible to use in the future, rather than in the present as 
Mitchell argued.21 As Vice Presidential candidate the following year, Roosevelt argued in a 
speech that, ‘it is highly unlikely that an airplane or a fleet of them could ever successfully 
attack a fleet of Navy vessels under battle conditions.’22 There is no evidence to suggest that 
Mitchell’s 1925 book Winged Defense or his later Skyways published in 1930 registered with 
Roosevelt. In any event, they dealt purely with what Mitchell described as military ‘air 
strategy’ and the contest for ‘supremacy of the air.’23 Roosevelt flattered Mitchell during his 
electoral campaign during 1932, but the White House shunned him by 1934 and he was dead 
by 1936.24  
 
Roosevelt was actually more a student of naval strategist Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan who 
argued for the importance of a strong battleship based US Navy with ports around the world 
                                                          
18 Sherry, Rise, 59-61. 
19 Jeffery S. Underwood, The Wings of Democracy – The Influence of Air Power on the Roosevelt 
Administration, 1933-1941 College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 1991 argues for the strong influence 
of political generals guiding the president in air power matters. In ‘Presidential Statesmen and U.S. Air Power – 
Personalities and Perceptions,’ in The Influence of Air Power upon History, 186 he further argues that Roosevelt 
rarely intervened in military matters and left the war to his commanders. Eric Larabee, Commander in Chief – 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and their War New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987 pictures an 
engaged and active Roosevelt in military affairs. 
20 For a full account of Mitchell’s ‘War’ with the US Navy see Thomas Wildenberg, Billy Mitchell’s War with 
the Navy – The Interwar Rivalry over Air Power Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2014. 
21 Burke Davis, The Billy Mitchell Affair New York, Random House, 1967, 51 and 58-60. 
22 Davis, Mitchell, 89-90. 
23 Mitchell, Winged Defense, 9. 
24 Sherry, Rise, 48-49. Davis, Mitchell, 338. 
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to promote American trade and protect national interests. On receiving Mahan’s book The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History for Christmas 1897, Roosevelt’s mother recalled he 
‘practically memorized the whole book’ while he later told his future wife Eleanor that he 
found the book “most illuminating.” The young Roosevelt similarly devoured Mahan’s The 
Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future received for his following birthday.25  
Also looming large in his early life was the presence of his fifth cousin and twenty-sixth 
president of the United States. Theodore Roosevelt’s overt expression of American power 
(also often naval) and unilateral intervention in matters pertaining to US interests captivated 
the younger Roosevelt. Indeed, not only did he mimic his cousin’s early career path he often 
mirrored his position on foreign relations, including becoming a staunch interventionist in 
World War I and a vociferous advocate of naval and military preparedness while the US 
remained neutral.26  
 
Whereas Mitchell provided little guidance on the wider diplomatic use of air power, both 
Mahan and TR provided an earlier example of the application of power to achieve national 
policy goals. Mahan clearly articulated how a state’s ability to influence world affairs came 
from concentrated maritime power extending beyond purely military effectiveness. For 
Mahan, national power operated within an expanded geography of US national interests 
extending way beyond national borders. Oceans were highways of travel, colonies were 
gateways to markets and resources and navies clearly had a deterrent, coercive, persuasive 
                                                          
25 Capt. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 Boston, Little, Brown and 
Company, 1890, Capt. A. T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power Present and Future Boston, Little, 
Brown and Company, 1897. Isabel Leighton and Gabrielle Forbrush, My Boy Franklin-As Told by Mrs James 
Roosevelt New York, Ray Long and Richard R. Smith Inc., 1933, 15. Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill 
1939-1941: The Partnership That Saved the West New York, W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1976, 37. Alan P. 
Dobson has noted the early importance of Mahan for Roosevelt. See FDR and Civil Aviation – Flying Strong, 
Flying Free New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 4-5. 
26 The main work suggesting TR as the major influence on FDR is John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the 
Priest – Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt Cambridge, Cambridge MA, Belknap Press, 1983, 359.  
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and moral diplomatic role beyond military conflict.27 That Franklin Roosevelt understood 
Mahan’s thinking on the application of naval power in wider diplomacy is clear. When a war 
scare erupted between the United States and Japan in 1913-1914, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy Roosevelt conducted a correspondence with Mahan encouraging him to write articles 
campaigning against splitting the fleet ‘during critical diplomatic negotiations.’28 In Simon 
Rofe’s view, Roosevelt had learned the ‘strategic necessities of international relations’ from 
Mahan. It was into this Mahanian framework and understanding of power on the international 
stage that Roosevelt later incorporated the implications of air power as he interacted with the 
British in wartime diplomacy. 
 
Churchill, like Roosevelt, had a practical understanding and appreciation of Mahan’s notions 
of power in international diplomacy, prompting Francis P. Sempa to describe him as a 
‘geopolitical practitioner, not a geopolitical theorist.’ The two had met in 1912 when Mahan 
visited Britain and, during their discussions, Churchill advised the American naval theorist 
that he had read his latest work Naval Strategy published the previous year. In the first 
volume of his history of World War I, The World Crisis, published in 1923, Churchill 
recounted that when he became head of the Admiralty in 1911 he found the navy ‘had made 
no important contribution to naval literature. The standard work on sea power was written by 
an American Admiral.’29 Although Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the 
Wilson administration, held the junior position, the parallels in the careers and experience of 
Churchill and Roosevelt and their exposure to the ideas of Mahan is striking. As national 
                                                          
27 J. Simon Rofe, ‘“Under the Influence of Mahan”: Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and their Understanding 
of American National Interest’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 19 2008, 732-745. 
28 Roosevelt to Mahan June 14, 1914 Franklin D. Roosevelt Library quoted by Rofe, ‘Under the Influence,’ 737. 
29 See Francis P. Sempa, ‘Churchillian Geopolitics: Mackinder, Mahan and the Preservation of the British 
Empire,’ Competition Forum Vol. 15, No. 1 2017 drawing on W. D. Paulson, Mahan, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1939 and Suzanne Geissler, God and Sea Power: The Influence of Religion on Alfred Thayer 




leaders during World War II, not only did they come to share a close friendship but found 
they spoke the same diplomatic language of power. As war cloud gathered, they recognised a 
similar understanding and outlook in each other that facilitated a dialogue on Anglo-
American air power as a deterrent, coercive, persuasive and moral force for diplomatic 
influence. 
 
Deterrent Air Power 
 
The deterrent potential of air power was initially most apparent to the British. Neville 
Chamberlain, as Chancellor of the Exchequer and then Prime Minister, was convinced that 
British security depended on the development of air power believing that ‘the Air Arm has 
emerged in recent years as a factor of first-rate, if not decisive importance.’30 Deterrence 
required numbers and credibility to be effective. Britain and France never had sufficient 
numbers of offensive aircraft before the war to present a credible threat or a willingness to 
declare forcefully that they would use them against potential enemies.31 The Germans 
concentrated on the immediate tactical rather than a strategic deterrent potential of military 
aircraft and this contributed to an inflated view of their air power on the diplomatic world 
stage. The implications of this perceived disparity in air power were clearly visible with 
British and French capitulation at Munich in September 1938.32  
 
Roosevelt cabled a brief ‘Good Man’ message when he learned Chamberlain was on his way 
to Munich to seal the fate of the Czechs.33 Some historians have pictured a rather hasty 
conversion to deterrence by Roosevelt at this point in the face German aggression while 
                                                          
30 Richard Overy, ‘Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939.’ Journal of Strategic Studies 
15:1, 81. 
31 Overy, ‘Air Power,’ 82 and 86. 
32 Overy, ‘Air Power,’ 89-90. 




others have seen it as a purely political calculation.34 Roosevelt, however, took a dim view of 
appeasement before Munich. After the resignation of Anthony Eden in opposition to the 
appeasement of Italy in February 1938, Roosevelt wrote ‘If a Chief to Police makes a deal 
with the leading gangsters and the deal results in no more holdups, that Chief of Police will 
be called a great man – but if the gangsters do not live up to their word the Chief of Police 
will go to jail…Some people are, I think taking very long chances – don’t you?’35 
 
As the world situation worsened, Roosevelt set about the creation of an adequate American 
aerial deterrent force grounded in his long-standing appreciation of Mahan’s notions of 
power. In January 1938, he declared American defence inadequate and asked for increased 
naval and air appropriations. On October 14 1938, he announced his intention to revise US 
defence plans and seek a further $500m in funding. Then at a key meeting of November 14, 
he settled on a figure of 10,000 planes and capacity to produce 10,000 more each year. 
According to Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Roosevelt explained 
that ‘When I write to foreign countries I must have something to back up my words. Had we 
this summer 5,000 planes and a capacity immediately to produce 10,000 per year…Hitler 
would not have dared to take the stand that he did.’36 Ambassador William Bullitt put it 
another way when he wrote to Roosevelt September 20 1938 ‘If you have enough airplanes 
you don’t have to go to Berchtesgaden.’37 On January 10 1939, Roosevelt lectured top Army 
officials that ‘the only check to a world war, which would be understood by Germany, would 
be the creation of a great air force and a powerful force in this country.’ The policy 
                                                          
34 For example, see David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor – Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of 
the Second World War Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 2001, 41. On the Roosevelt’s political motivations, see Barbara 
Rearden Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis – A Study in Political Decision-Making Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1997 and Dallek, Foreign Policy, 172-175. 
35 Roosevelt to John Cudahy March 9, 1938 Roosevelt, Letters, 232. 
36 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938-1941 Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 
1965, 49. 
37 Sherry, Rise, 76-78. 
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recognised American alarm over German aggression, aversion to overseas military 
expeditions and a desire to preserve isolation, but also indicated a marriage with a longer-
term understanding of international power that went beyond imitating the approach of the 
Fuehrer.38  
 
Chief of the Air Corps, Gen. Henry H. ‘Hap’ Arnold, called the planned increases the Air 
Forces’ ‘Magna Charta,’ but the new policy did not necessarily represent an alliance with 
bomber advocates. The only clear strategic goal was hemispheric defence along with aid to 
strengthen the British and French position.39 French defeat in 1940 forced a further radical 
recasting of Roosevelt’s deterrent policy. On May 16 1940, Roosevelt asked Congress for 
vast appropriations: 
 
to superimpose on this production capacity a greatly increased additional production capacity. 
I should like to see this nation geared up to the ability to turn out at least 50,000 planes a 
year. Furthermore, I believe that this nation should plan at this time a program that would 
provide us with 50,000 military and naval planes.40 
 
The purpose was to prevent the hampering of foreign orders and to head off the production 
capacity of ‘one belligerent power’ [Germany] though this was consistently over-estimated 
by US intelligence. After November 1940, air power increasingly emerged as an attractive, 
cheap alternative to full belligerence that did not necessarily have support from the American 
people. The policy aimed at Germany also began to appeal as protection for American 
interests in other parts of the world. In July 1941, Roosevelt sent B-17s to Philippines as a 
deterrent to Japanese aggression. Henry Stimson even claimed the bomber ‘had completely 
changed the strategy of the Pacific,’ but it was more a sign of desperation that placed so much 
                                                          
38 Sherry, Rise, 80 and 82. 
39 Sherry, Rise, 89. Dallek, Foreign Policy, 173. 
40 Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Appropriations for National Defense May 16, 1940 Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209636  
accessed October 20, 2019. Crevald, Age, 120 suggests he plucked the figure from thin air. Sherry, Rise, 91. 
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optimism in the bomber.41 From deterrence, however, was born the American plan for 
command of the air not just for the US, but for key allies also. Roosevelt’s request to 
Secretary of War and Navy on July 9 1941, requiring overall production requirements to 
‘defeat our potential enemies’ resulted in the Air War Plans Division’s AWPD/1 and 
eventually AWPD/42 that set out a comprehensive air plan for defeating the Axis powers.42 
These pivotal planning documents underpinned not just American but Allied command of the 
air with the US going on to build an incredible 299,293 planes during World War II.43 While 
the plans undoubtedly contributed to the eventual military victory, they also facilitated and 
underpinned an enhanced Anglo-American personal diplomacy of air power. 
 
Coercive Air Power 
 
Mahan repeatedly stressed the value of power in diplomacy asserting that ‘the weaker we are 
in organized military strength, the more easy [sic] it is for our opponents to yield our 
points.’44 As leaders, both Roosevelt and Churchill understood Mahan’s point. Roosevelt had 
gained a first-hand illustration in Paris in 1919 when Wilson used the threat of a naval arms 
race with the British to gain acceptance of his plan for the League of Nations and carried the 
lesson on to his presidential wartime leadership.45 This was evident in Roosevelt’s 
declaration of unconditional surrender at Casablanca in January 1943 that he connected to his 
desire for ‘command of the air by democracies.’ He defined ‘unconditional surrender’ at the 
time as a ‘reasonable assurance of future world peace’ adding ‘it does not mean the 
destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean the destruction of 
                                                          
41 Biddle, Rhetoric, 262 and Sherry, Rise, 101-102. 
42 Conrad Crane, American Air Power Strategy, 28 and 32. Sherry, Rise, 99. See also Haywood S. Hansell, The 
Air Plan that Defeated Hitler Atlanta, Arno Press, 1972. 
43 Phillips Payson O’Brien, How the War Was Won – Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 46 and 485.O’Brien argues the American, British and Soviet air 
forces would have been considerably smaller and victory a longer-term aim with Roosevelt’s decision. 
44 A. T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 
1897, 98. 
45 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt – The Ordeal, Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1954, 3-15. 
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the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and the subjugation of other 
people.’46  
 
There has been considerable debate about whether Churchill knew about Roosevelt’s 
declaration in advance as it did not feature in the official press release and both parties 
indicated spontaneity subsequently. Robert Dallek is convincing in his suggestion that a 
‘spontaneous’ unconditional surrender offered a compromise over a disagreement with 
Churchill who questioned whether Italy should be included in the demand.47 The declaration 
offered much on which the two could agree. It was a very clear statement designed to keep 
the Soviets committed to the war and away from a separate peace, but would also prevent any 
recurrence of the ‘stab in the back’ myth from World War I for Germany whereby the 
manoeuvres of politicians and diplomats took the blame for defeat. In August of 1944, 
Roosevelt told Secretary of War, Henry Stimson ‘it is of the utmost importance that every 
person in Germany shall realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation…The fact…must 
be so impressed upon them that they will hesitate to start any new war.’48 Roosevelt stuck to 
this position for the rest of the war concerning the Germans and steadfastly refused to define 
unconditional surrender beyond ridding ‘them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian 
militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute a ‘Master Race’.”…it is 
best to permit our understanding of unconditional surrender to rest upon that!’49 While both 
leaders would later face accusations of needlessly extending the war with the declaration, 
                                                          
46 Roosevelt, Joint Press Conference with Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca January 24, 1943 Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210111 accessed October 20, 2019. See also Roosevelt, Address to the 
White House Correspondents' Association February 12, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209772  accessed October 20, 2019. 
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they could actually argue the opposite. Unconditional surrender facilitated the full force of 
Allied air power and justified the continued bombing of Germany to eradicate all dissent. It 
was, to Roosevelt and Churchill, the surest way to avoid future conflict. Allowing any of the 
Axis powers to, in Mahan’s words, ‘yield our points’ through bargaining and negotiation 
would be to deny the coercive potential of command of the air. 
 
Despite his earlier doubt on the inclusion of Italy in an ‘unconditional surrender’ declaration, 
when it came to peripheral Axis powers, Roosevelt could be less of a zealot with Churchill 
acting to keep him on track. Heavy bombing of Sofia, Bulgaria in November 1943 initiated 
some informal peace feelers from the Bulgarian government. Roosevelt thought ‘it would be 
worth while [sic] for us to make some concessions such as suspending bombing attacks on 
Bulgaria for a limited period and with your sending representatives to meet the Bulgarian 
Mission in Istanbul.’50 The British did not like Roosevelt’s suggestion of peace with a 
German ally who had been at war with Britain since June 5, 1942. Churchill replied ‘Eden 
and I are agreed here that the bombing of Bulgarian targets as weather permits should not be 
stopped because of the peace overtures. If the medicine has done good, let them have more of 
it.’ Roosevelt accepted the correction and replied ‘I wholly agree…Let the good work go 
on.’51 
 
Democratic command of the air also enabled Britain and the US to attempt to coerce other 
neutral nations to support their diplomatic and military goals, but this very much depended on 
their understanding of interest and relative power. In 1943, the British and Russians favoured 
measures to draw Turkey into the war on the Allied side. The Soviets wanted to coerce them 
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by stopping supply shipments, while the British favoured a more positive approach. The 
Americans believed Turkish entry would overstretch Allied resources and proposed as an 
alternative leasing some air bases from the Turks instead with Roosevelt communicating 
‘This government agrees to join Great Britain and Soviet in making immediate demand on 
Turkey for the use of air bases and later pressing Turkey to enter the war.’ Nothing 
eventually came of this particular proposal suggesting real limits on the extent of Allied 
power and that the Turks had their own agenda of trying to acquire military equipment to 
protect themselves from the Soviets.52 
 
As the war progressed, Churchill was more mindful of the future threat from Soviet 
Communism while Roosevelt continued to be more concerned with the health of the ‘Grand 
Alliance.’ When concern grew that a German withdrawal from Greece might leave the door 
open for a Communist takeover, Churchill obtained agreement from Roosevelt to use 
American transport aircraft to ferry British troops into the country.53 There were, however, 
limits to the coercive diplomatic nature of air power that could expose differences between 
British and American policy and capabilities. Roosevelt was more reluctant to take on the 
Soviets in areas they dominated than Churchill was. In August 1944, when Polish patriots 
rose against their German occupiers in Warsaw, Churchill wanted to use aircraft to drop 
supplies in support of their efforts. Although now close to the area, Stalin was happy to let his 
enemies destroy each other. Churchill believed that Allied victories that summer put them in 
a strong enough position to challenge the Soviets, but Roosevelt thought otherwise. He was 
prepared to appeal to Stalin to work together to ‘do the utmost to save as many of the patriots 
there as possible’ by dropping supplies but gave the impression the appeal was more of a 
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public relations exercise. When Stalin denied landing rights for Allied aircraft, Roosevelt 
took a pragmatic approach noting their dominance in the area. He advised Churchill ‘My 
information points to the practical impossibility of our providing supplies to the Warsaw 
Poles unless we are permitted to land on and take off from Soviet airfields. I do not see that 
we can take additional steps at the present time that promise results.’54 
 
Churchill was prepared to circumvent Soviet objections by sending the RAF on night 
operations at the limit of their range from August 19 to September 29 to drop a small tonnage 
of supplies to the Polish fighters.55 Likely realising the RAF’s limited impact, he continued to 
try to convince Roosevelt to press the issue suggesting a cable to Stalin warning that allied 
aircraft would go in arguing that ‘I feel we ought to go in and see what happens. I cannot 
conceive that he would maltreat or detain them [the pilots and crews].’ At that moment, 
Roosevelt had more pressing concerns about the continued presence of American bases in the 
Ukraine used for the ‘Shuttle Missions’ of Operation Frantic and his attempts to negotiate 
access to Siberian airfields for use in attacking Japan. He also clearly had the health of the 
‘Grand Alliance’ in mind when he stated ‘I do not consider it advantageous to the long range 
general war prospect for me to join with you in the proposed message to U. J. [Uncle Joe].’ 
Underlining the clear power differential with Britain he added ‘I have no objection to your 
sending such a message if you consider it advisable to do so.’56 Churchill still did not give up 
on the Warsaw Poles and wrote again to Roosevelt on September 4 pointing out that Stalin’s 
refusal threatened future relations and undermined the position of the Polish government in 
exile. Churchill then moved to ‘beg that you will again consider the big stakes involved. 
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Could you not authorize your Air Forces to carry out this operation, landing if necessary, on 
Russian airfields without their formal consent?...I cannot think the Russians could reject this 
fait accompli.’57 Roosevelt merely replied that it was now too late and the situation had 
‘unfortunately been solved by delay and German action.’ This was not true as the fighting 
continued into October, but the realities of the diplomatic limitations of air power and its 
interrelationship with other spheres clearly indicated that he did not view it as an 
overwhelming force in the context of the Grand Alliance.58 Stalin did finally consent to an 
American supply mission (Frantic-7) flown on September 18 that dropped approximately 100 
tons of supplies that largely landed in German held areas. The Americans scheduled a further 
Frantic mission, but the last Polish fighters capitulated on October 2, 1944 before it could 
take place.59 
 
Persuasive Air Power 
 
Aerial dominance played an important role in shaping alliance diplomacy between Britain 
and the United States. When Roosevelt decided to increase American air power, it provided a 
carrot in addition to a stick with which to influence allied nations. It contributed to the 
survival of France and Britain, but after French defeat in June 1940, the ‘Arsenal of 
Democracy’ stepped up its provision of all aid ‘short of war’ to Britain via Lend-Lease 
following the passing of legislation by Congress in March 1941.60 Initially, this was to give 
Britain the arms to fight and prevent their defeat rather than to bring about direct American 
involvement. Churchill was never slow to point out his nation’s requirements to the 
Americans, sending his famous letter to Roosevelt of December 1940 pointing out the dire 
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state of Britain’s defences and finances.61 He also specifically pointed out the deficiency in 
British aerial defences in 1940 noting the Germans ‘have still a formidable numerical 
superiority. Our most vital need is therefore delivery at the earliest possible date of the largest 
possible number of Curtiss P-40 fighters’62 The close cooperation between the two nations 
helped Roosevelt realise that British survival and American security did not just depend on 
sending aircraft but the pilots needed to fly them. Churchill had suggested this need to 
Roosevelt’s air officers visiting Britain in 1940. He noted ‘when your officers were over here 
we were talking in terms of pilots.’63 The response was twofold. Roosevelt authorised his 
own Army and Navy pilots to fly aircraft from the factories to the eventual despatch airfields, 
freeing up British ferry pilots and allowed his air force chief, Gen. Arnold, to allocate one 
third of pilot training capacity in the US to British and Commonwealth recruits.64 
 
Once the immediate danger from German invasion receded, it became more practical to think 
about going on the offensive and air power again offered a practical way to do so. The British 
therefore pressured the Americans for a larger share of their bomber production. Roosevelt 
was happy to agree. He told Secretary of War, Henry Stimson in May 1941 ‘we should get 
our big bomber program up to a monthly rate of 500 a month…The British are asking for 
very large numbers of additional bombers…Hap Arnold has just returned from Britain where 
he learned the need was for heavy bombers to attack Germany.’ His public memorandum of 
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the following day confirmed his decision that the US would underwrite what he called 
command of the air by the democracies.65  
 
Such an increased output from American aircraft production delivered to the British meant 
accepting an American voice in policy that drew away from the campaign against Germany. 
When Admiral King persuaded Roosevelt for greater bombing of German U-Boat production 
and bases in 1942, the president went out of his way to tell Churchill to make the bombing of 
submarine bases and manufacturing an extra special priority.66 Churchill duly confirmed that 
‘The highest importance is attached by us to bombing U-Boat construction yards and bases’ 
and ‘we are emphasising bombing attacks on U-Boat nests.’67 At the beginning of 1943, the 
growing American contribution again challenged British operational doctrine. Following 
heavy losses and a demonstrable inability to hit precision targets, RAF Bomber Command 
advocated night area bombing over American daylight precision bombing. Churchill pushed 
hard for the Americans to join the British effort, but the Americans stood their ground 
convincing Churchill with the ‘round the clock’ approach hammered out at the Casablanca 
Conference in January 1943.68 
  
American production also gave them an increasingly loud voice in Allied Command 
appointments. When the British suggested Air Marshall Sholto Douglas take command of the 
South East Asia theatre, Roosevelt made the disapproval of his military clear. Gen. Marshall 
opposed the move believing Sholto Douglas to be anti-American. Roosevelt called for an 
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alternative who ‘understands the complications of Allied Command and has demonstrated 
outstanding ability’ before suggesting Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham as a suitable 
candidate. Perhaps sensitive to the delicacy of what he was suggesting he finished with the 
underlined ‘I will of course abide fully by your decisions and give unquestioned support to 
carrying out the task.’69 Churchill was clearly irritated answering that ‘I am absolutely 
convinced that there is no foundation for the suggestions which have been made that this 
most capable officer has shown lack of good will and loyalty towards the United States or its 
officers.’ Nevertheless, it was difficult to refuse the Americans and Sholto Douglas 
transferred to Coastal Command.70 
 
Aerial power allowed the Americans to shape Allied policy to their longer-term benefit. The 
Allies had long viewed the Azores as important to the Battle of the Atlantic and as the plans 
unfolded for the invasion of Europe its attractiveness as a base and staging post for aircraft 
only increased. The Azores were neutral Portuguese territory, but even so, Roosevelt and 
Churchill had been discussing the annexation of the islands since their meeting in Placentia 
Bay in August 1941. These discussions led to an agreement at the Trident Conference in 
Washington in May of 1943 that the islands would be annexed by the Allies if requested 
bases were not agreed to by the Portuguese – via the never implemented ‘Operation Alacrity’ 
plan for invasion of the islands. Outright annexation of a neutral’s territory would not reflect 
well on the Allied cause, so the British preferred to invoke the 500-year old Anglo-
Portuguese Alliance in their request for basing rights. Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal 
accepted the compromise in the hope of maintaining neutrality and in accordance with an 
Anglo-Portuguese agreement signed August 17, 1943 the British accepted bases at Lejas and 
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Santana in the Azores on October 8, 1943.71 Roosevelt and Churchill agreed at the Quebec 
Conference that American forces would also enter the Azores a few weeks later. This raised 
issues for the Portuguese who were worried about German retaliation, the local economic 
impact and possibly that American influence would remain after the war despite Roosevelt’s 
statement that ‘He [Prime Minister Salazar] may be assured that the United States has no 
desire to remain after the war in any Portuguese territory.’72 The British were also concerned 
the American military were using their aircraft ferrying needs as an entry route for civilian 
aviation dominance post-war. Pan American was requesting air facilities for military 
contracted flights in the Azores from January 1943 onward and the Air Force was 
pressurising Roosevelt to comply.73 The US military claimed this was for ferrying military 
aircraft, but the British did not think the requirement for American military bases in the 
Azores was strong enough to risk a diplomatic dispute with the Portuguese. They advised 
they could not support sending American troops there ‘until Portuguese agreement is 
obtained’ noting ‘we are not in occupation of the islands.’74  
 
On November 8, 1943, Roosevelt informed Churchill that the American Charge d’affairs in 
Lisbon, George Kennan, would take up the question with Salazar directly and requested 
British support. The immediate goal was to facilitate the delivery of aircraft for the coming 
cross Channel invasion, but the suspicion between the British and Americans over post-war 
aviation remained.75 When the Portuguese appeared to reverse an agreement (of December 
1943) to permit US aircraft to operate out of the British bases, Roosevelt considered sending 
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the aircraft anyway advising Churchill ‘If you agree it is my desire to send the Squadron at an 
early date as planned disregarding Salazar’s change of mind.’76 Churchill discouraged the use 
of force by the US and even suggested mischievously that the Americans operate under 
British markings and uniforms. He then further cautioned ‘Although we possess 
overwhelming strength it would be as you yourself felt rather inconsistent with our general 
attitude towards small powers to override them roughly in matters of neutrality.’77 The 
Americans were able to ferry aircraft via the British airfield at Lejas during 1944 and their 
own negotiations eventually bore fruit with the acquisition of an airfield at Santa Maria for 
military flights from August 1944 and an accord with Pan American to use the field in 
December that year.78 
 
The British could do little to counter persuasive American air power gaining a foothold in the 
Azores, but this was not the only area they felt pressure from their ally. Although beyond the 
scope of this essay, American post-war civilian aviation interests began to make themselves 
felt in alliance diplomacy in the later years of the war.79 With considerably less productive 
capacity than the Americans, the British had opted to focus on bomber and fighter aircraft 
production for the duration of the war. Under the Arnold-Powers Agreement of 1942, the 
British agreed to cede military transport aircraft production and supply to the Americans. 
This had clear implications for the domination of the post-war airline industry because it 
would use converted American military aircraft as no viable British alternative existed. 
Although the British Brabazon Committee planned to recapture sectors of the market with 
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technologically superior aircraft, the Americans would dominate the immediate post-war 
aviation industry. This led them to see the coming rivalry with the British in terms of routes 
and access rather than aircraft.80  
  
Indicative of this was a small dispute that arose over a US request to halt an Air Ministry plan 
to survey Clipperton Island in the eastern Pacific. The US feared that Britain was looking for 
post-war air routes that circumvented the US. The island was actually under French control, 
but the US established radio and weather facilities there without permission anyway. 
Churchill feared the Americans wished to take advantage of their wartime concentration on 
transport aircraft writing to Roosevelt ‘You will have the greatest navy in the world. You will 
have the greatest air force. You will have the greatest trade. You have all the gold.’ Roosevelt 
brushed aside Prime Minister’s protests and his further complaints about a recent bi-lateral 
civil aviation agreement with Republic of Ireland.81 The competition over access and routes 
was clearly the American priority. Roosevelt was quite willing to use Lend-Lease supplies to 
encourage the British to make a post-war civil aviation agreement advantageous to the 
Americans. He advised Churchill ‘We are doing our best to meet your lend-lease needs. We 
will face Congress in that subject in a few weeks and it will not be in a generous mood if it 
and the people feel the United Kingdom has not agreed to a generally beneficial air 
agreement.’82 As the war progressed, it increasingly looked as if Roosevelt took a more 
global Mahanian view that prioritised ‘national wealth and greatness.’ 
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Anglo-American air power did not just present opportunities to persuade one another it also 
presented the possibility of joint proposals to the Soviets as the third member of the ‘Grand 
Alliance.’ In 1942, Roosevelt and Churchill had to advise Stalin there would be no second 
front in Europe that year and that they would cut back supply convoys to Russia. Facing a 
difficult diplomatic situation with their ally, the President and Prime Minister searched for a 
counter to, in Churchill’s words, ‘take the edge off various Russian disappointments about 
the Second Front in 1942, about the PQ Convoys, etc.’83 Churchill, in a letter to Roosevelt 
dated August 30, 1942, suggested placing an Anglo-American Air Force on the southern 
flank of the Russian armies in the Caucasus to strengthen Russian air power, to shield 
interests in Persia and Abadan and for the moral effect of good comradeship in an operation 
known as VELVET. He also suggested it might make Stalin more amenable to asking some 
‘favors’ for the Poles.84 Roosevelt was in ‘full accordance with the desirability of it 
[VELVET]’ stating ‘I appreciate the importance of Stalin knowing that we mean business.’85  
 
Roosevelt encountered some opposition to this further commitment from his military 
commanders, particularly Gen. Marshall, who called it out as a ‘moral’ rather than practical 
decision. The President began to row back in late September suggesting ‘I am convinced that 
the air force should be made up entirely of British units under British control’ and delaying 
making a final decision on the deployment.86 Warren Kimball suggests that Roosevelt 
eventually insisted on the force for the Caucasus with his military, announcing on October 6 
that ‘we are prepared to send a heavy bomber group to VELVET in addition to an air 
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transport group. I am anxious that we have on that front a real Anglo-American Air Force.’87 
Churchill then sent the offer to Stalin on October 8, 1942 emphasising the joint effort by 
stating ‘The President and I’ are anxious ‘to put an Anglo-American Air Force on your 
southern flank and operate it under the strategic control of the Soviet High Command.’88 
 
Stalin showed scant interest in the idea and by late October, Churchill was starting to feel 
despondent with ‘no progress made in the necessary arrangements with Russia.’ Roosevelt 
was not ‘unduly disturbed’ having decided ‘that they do not use speech for the same purposes 
that we do.’ He went on that ‘I feel very sure the Russians are going to hold this winter and 
that we should proceed vigorously with our plans both to supply them and to set up an air 
force to fight with them. I want us to be able to say to Mr. Stalin that we have carried out our 
obligations one hundred percent.’89 Roosevelt inadvertently identified the supply 
vulnerability contained in the offer. Stalin now came back with a counter proposal to accept 
the aircraft only as an increase to Soviet production allotments rather than the Allied piloted 
force. Churchill was dismissive that ‘the replacement of the whole or greater part of 
VELVET force by the equivalent in aircraft…would destroy the whole Raison D’Etre of the 
plan.’ He further explained that since the offer ‘immense improvements have occurred in the 
Russian position on the…Southern front. At the same time by the Anglo American successes 
among the whole North African front we have shown the Russians that we are active 
comrades in the war and they are impressed by this.’ Churchill therefore did not ‘wish to 
force upon them what it costs us so much to give.’90 Roosevelt was unwilling to give up on 
VELVET so easily stating ‘I would not wish to give him any authority to call that enterprise 
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off because it seems to me to have great political and possibly military advantages.’ Quite 
what the great political advantages were is unclear, but they were possibly a mitigation of 
future Allied disappointments of the Soviets on the way, with the decision to pursue a 
Mediterranean strategy in 1943 leading to further convoy cancellations. Churchill replied ‘I 
entirely agree.’91  
 
It was not the last time that the British and Americans used air power to attempt to placate the 
Russians. Indeed, the contribution of the Allied strategic air campaign proved a stalwart 
excuse for delaying the land invasion of Europe in the face of Soviet protests until the spring 
of 1944. Stalin had rejected VELVET and this left Roosevelt sending a plaintive message to 
Stalin that ‘I am just not clear as to just what has happened in regard to our offer of American 
air assistance in the Caucasus.’92 The Americans persisted, however, and the scheme 
eventually mutated into cooperation with the Soviets in the strategic bombing campaign with 
the ‘Shuttle’ missions of Operation Frantic using bases in the Ukraine during the summer of 
1944. Roosevelt had raised the matter at the Tehran Conference in late 1943 and Stalin finally 
agreed after months of complex negotiations involving Ambassador Harriman in Moscow 
and Roosevelt’s son, Elliott, a Colonel leading a Photo Reconnaissance Wing flying in 
Europe. By that stage of the war, immediate American motives were to aid the strategic 
bombing campaign and set a framework for future bombing missions to Japan from bases in 
Siberia. For Roosevelt, it also provided another opportunity to encourage friendly relations 
with the Soviets and demonstrate the selflessness of the US to the cause of victory. Stalin was 
lacklustre in this enthusiasm and the operation proved a costly and frustrating failure. The 
Russians certainly felt they could learn from American methods and technology, but foreign 
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aircraft on home soil would expose acute vulnerabilities to possible future American air 
attack and interfere with plans for the subjugation of Eastern Europe. It was, perhaps, more 
than Stalin’s paranoid regime could contemplate.93 
 
Moral Air Power 
 
Both Britain and the US had few qualms about conducting a general strategic bombing 
campaign in Europe. After the Butt Report of August 1941 highlighted the RAF’s inability to 
hit specified targets with any degree of accuracy, it officially became a campaign of area 
rather than precision bombing for the British. From February 14, 1942, they specifically 
‘focussed on the morale of the enemy civil population,’ a policy implemented by the new 
head of RAF Bomber Command, Arthur Harris, appointed less than a week later.94 Churchill 
appeared enthusiastic about the change, writing to Roosevelt in March 1942 that ‘Never was 
there so much good work to be done and so few to do it. We must not let our summer attack 
on Germany decline into a second rate affair.’95 He later added that ‘I am sure we should be 
missing great opportunities if we did not concentrate every available Fortress and long range 
escort fighter as quickly as possible for the attack on our primary enemy.’96 Despite his 
earlier appeals to refrain from bombing, Roosevelt shared Churchill’s view of bombing as a 
necessity once in the war.97 Stating his true feelings to his friend Henry Morgenthau in 1941 
he said ‘I have suggested again and again that if they [the British] sent a hundred planes over 
Germany for military objectives that ten of them should bomb some of these smaller towns 
that haven’t been bombed before…That is the only way to break German morale.’98 
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Both the British and American leadership repeatedly denied in public that they were in the 
business of the indiscriminate bombing of Germany. In a House of Commons debate on 
bombing in late 1943, the Secretary of Air Sir Archibald Sinclair repeatedly contended that 
British policy remained focussed on military targets and not area bombing. This was after the 
Operation Gomorrah attacks on Hamburg in July 1943 and the commencement of the ‘Battle 
of Berlin’ in November that clearly suggested otherwise.99 Roosevelt used a similar evasion 
to deny any American participation in indiscriminate bombing when his military knew that 
both the technological limitations of the day and the poor European weather made it highly 
probable on occasion. In a speech to Congress on September 8, 1943 Roosevelt claimed ‘We 
[Americans] are not bombing tenements for the sadistic pleasure of killing as the Nazis did, 
but blowing to bits carefully selected targets – factories, shipyards, munition dumps.’100 
Whatever Roosevelt might say in public, neither he nor his military commanders had any 
aversion to terror bombing when it suited their purposes. In September 1944, he requested a 
study on the ‘psychological and morale’ impact of bombing and ordered plans prepared, as 
indeed all other combatants did, for chemical and bacteriological warfare if the situation 
arose.101 Local American commanders may have been keen to distance themselves from 
British area bombing at times, but their disquiet with operations such as Clarion (attacking 
communications) and Thunderclap (bombing German towns including Dresden) in 1945 were 
for practical or public opinion reasons rather than a moral position.102 
 
The American military confirmed that they were comfortable with indiscriminate bombing 
when they put forward a plan, supported by Roosevelt, at the end of March 1945 to use ‘war-
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weary’ bombers packed with 20,000 pounds of high explosive against German targets set on 
course with approximate timing devices. They had tried similar methods before on a smaller 
scale in the summer of 1944 with the ‘Aphrodite’ and ‘Anvil’ experiments using remotely 
guided pilotless bomb planes directed at V-Weapon sites in France. These had been 
ineffective and cost several lives, including that of Joseph P. Kennedy Jr., in an accidental 
detonation over East Anglia. Keen on the latest project, Roosevelt complained to Churchill 
that ‘your Chiefs of Staff originally agreed’ after they withdrew their agreement probably 
because of concerns that the bombers would be ineffective. Roosevelt enthusiastically 
continued ‘My Chiefs of Staff inform me that they consider this weapon to be the most 
valuable in our all-out offensive against Germany…many lucrative targets in the industrial 
areas of Germany can be levelled and the German effort correspondingly weakened.’ 
Responding to British concerns over retaliation, he added ‘I can assure you that pilotless 
bombers will be launched only from bases in the continent which would appear to minimize 
the chances of retaliatory action against England. The enemy need to ‘feel the full weight of 
our resources at this propitious hour’103  
 
Churchill remained reluctant to give permission for the indiscriminate attacks with such 
weapons.104 Ultimately, it was an American political decision and the Prime Minister handed 
it back to Truman who closed the matter in April 1945. Nobody wanted to authorise such an 
unwarranted and risky scheme so close to the end of the war.105 Far better to demonstrate the 
continued moral benefits of aircraft with Churchill requesting a joint Anglo-American 
demand that the German government permit the Allies to provide food and medicine for the 
German occupied Netherlands via an emergency airdrop. Roosevelt agreed a joint message 
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but died before he saw the results with Operation Manna run by the RAF and Operation 
Chowhound run by the USAAF in late April early May 1945.106  
 
None of the above meant that either leader was blind to the moral constraints on the use of air 
power. Churchill clearly had his personal doubts about the aerial destruction visited on 
Germany. Richard Casey, serving in Churchill’s war cabinet, recorded in his diary that on 
watching a film of RAF bombers in action over the Ruhr, Churchill exclaimed ‘Are we 
animals? Are we taking this too far?’107 For either the Prime Minister or President to respond 
publicly to these concerns or alter policy, however, required the political or diplomatic 
implications of the question to have a bearing. There was certainly opposition to ‘obliteration 
bombing’ in Britain manifested in the Bombing Restriction Committee and particularly the 
work of writer and campaigner Vera Brittain. In her Seeds of Chaos published in early 1944, 
Brittain exposed the euphemisms used by politicians and air leaders to hide the reality of the 
bombing of Germany. In doing so, she aimed to counter the argument that the campaign 
would shorten the war and prove that it was only a continuation of atrocities similar to those 
committed by the Germans.108 The book generated little response in a war weary United 
Kingdom, but an indignant one in the United States. Published as ‘Massacre by Bombing’ in 
Fellowship Magazine, 28 well-known clergymen signed it in approval. The insinuation that 
America was involved in something morally wrong prompted a furious public response. The 
New York Times reported their mail ran 50 to 1 against Brittain’s argument. Counter 
commentary in press and journal editorials ranged from the need to do what is necessary in 
war to outright accusations of Brittain giving a mouthpiece to Nazi propaganda.109 The 
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controversy reached the White House where Roosevelt’s confident political assessment of the 
country’s mood led to a stinging series of rebuttals. Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson 
accused the Bombing Restriction Committee of ‘giving encouragement to the enemy.’ 
Eleanor Roosevelt called Brittain’s argument ‘sentimental nonsense.’ The president himself 
got his Press Secretary, Steve Early to respond to the original Fellowship article with a 
depiction of a stark conflict between civilization and destruction and arguing for the necessity 
of bombing to shorten the war.110  
 
With the potential bombing of culturally sensitive sites or occupied countries and peoples, 
both Roosevelt and Churchill drew on a language of military necessity and moral superiority 
to justify their decisions. When the question of bombing Rome and areas close to the Vatican 
arose in 1943, both were happy to forego cultural sensitivities and give permission for 
entirely practical military reasons.111 Roosevelt, however, made particular efforts to maintain 
moral authority. In outlining the response to a request from the Pope in late 1942 that Rome 
not be bombed, Roosevelt fell back on his pre-war desire to exclude ‘unfortified cities’ from 
bombing. He wrote to Cordell Hull ‘I really think that England and the United States could 
agree not to bomb Rome on condition that the city itself, outside the Vatican, be not used in 
any shape, manner or form either by the Germans or the Italians for war purposes.’ He then 
added ‘I should think that we might consider that it is up to the Vatican itself to propose that 
Rome be demilitarized…so that there is no reason for us to bomb it.’112 When the issue 
resurfaced in 1943 he again placed the moral question in the hands of the Pope and the 
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Germans by suggesting that ‘the Vatican try to have Rome declared an open city i.e. that all 
military installations, activities and personnel…be removed from Rome.’113  
 
Roosevelt further distanced Allied leaders from the moral decisions involved in bombing by 
placing it within the space of local military commanders. He was clear ‘that Eisenhower 
should be given full discretion as to the necessity from a military point of view of 
bombing…and should be given full discretion as to the time if and when he considers the 
attack advantageous.’114 Placing his faith in the doctrine of precision bombing, he requested 
that ‘Prior to launching these attacks all pilots concerned must be thoroughly instructed on 
the geography of the area, the location of the Vatican, and directed that they must not permit 
any bombs to fall in the Vatican City.’115 This was not an isolated exception, Roosevelt later 
prompted an outcry from the Vatican when he used similar reasoning for the controversial 
bombing of Monte Casino Abbey in 1944 arguing it was a German ‘strongpoint’ and telling 
the press the attack had been a ‘military necessity.’116 
 
The British too were quite capable of deferring to their military as a moral justification of 
what they were doing to Germany. Churchill and his Chief of the Air Staff, Charles Portal 
singularly failed to effectively rein in Arthur Harris from prosecuting the RAF’s area 
bombing campaign and switch to the agreed Allied strategy of attacking oil targets late in the 
war. Historians have suggested that Churchill was blind to the moral questions of how they 
were using air power until quite late in the war, not writing a minute questioning area 
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bombing until March 28, 1945.117 Yet the Prime Minister was equally capable of discussing 
the cultural or human impact at times with his American ally and their management of air 
power thus does represent an Anglo-American moral discourse. The clearest example of this 
is the Allied pre-invasion Transportation plan of 1944. The use of Allied air power in the run 
up to the invasion of Europe caused considerable disagreement between those who wanted to 
follow Director of the British Bombing Survey Unit Solomon ‘Solly’ Zuckerman’s plan to 
attack transportation nodes in the supply area of France and those wishing to continue the 
strategic focus against Germany. Churchill believed a strategic focus against the German Air 
Force should be maintained and objected to the transportation plan because the desired result 
may not be achievable and on the diplomatic and moral grounds that the excessive projected 
casualties among French civilians (80,000 including 20,000 killed) were unacceptable. In 
early May 1944, he wrote to Roosevelt: 
 
I am satisfied that all possible care will be taken to minimize this slaughter of friendly 
civilian life. Nevertheless, the War Cabinet share my apprehension of the bad effect which 
will be produced upon the French civilian population by these slaughters…They may easily 
bring about a great revulsion in French feeling towards their approaching United States and 
British liberators. They may leave a legacy of hate behind them…Consider the matter from 
the highest political standpoint and give us your opinion as a matter between governments.118 
 
Roosevelt, characteristically, deferred to his military planners (though not his Air 
Commanders who wanted to continue the strategic campaign) who thought the operation 
worthwhile. Echoing his decision over Rome he stated ‘However regrettable the attendant 
loss of civilian lives is, I am not prepared to impose from this distance any restriction on 
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military action by the responsible commanders that in their opinion might militate against the 
success of Overlord or cause additional loss of life to our Allied Forces of invasion.’119 
 
Roosevelt and Churchill, fearful of their forces becoming bogged-down in France, both 
ultimately appealed to St. Augustine’s argument of a ‘just war.’ Bringing a swift victory and 
preventing the longer and greater suffering of the enslaved French people was a way around 
the dilemmas of using their air power in occupied countries.120 It was an argument both found 
could apply equally to their enemies. When called to use Allied air power to put a stop to the 
Holocaust by either bombing the death camps or the train lines connecting them to the 
outside world, both leaders demurred. Churchill appeared the most supportive instructing his 
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden to ‘Get anything out of the Air Force you can and invoke 
me if necessary,’ but ultimately both he and Roosevelt deferred to their military who resented 
any diversion from their pursuit of victory.121 The idea of a ‘just war’ contributed to the 
growing numbers of German civilian deaths in 1945. Allied air power in Europe, by this 
stage, had acquired its own momentum policed alternately by either Roosevelt or Churchill to 
keep the other on track. Not applying its full force now risked sacrificing the ‘just’ nature of 
the war by causing unnecessary Allied deaths, delaying victory, and risking a future 
reoccurrence of conflict by appearing to invite diplomacy in moderating the terms of 
unconditional surrender.  
 
An Augustinian deferral to military commanders to circumvent the moral considerations of 
air power did contribute to the American firebombing of Japan and eventual use of atomic 
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weapons there in 1945, but it would be incorrect to suggest that Roosevelt and Churchill 
thought of atomic weaponry only in terms of deployment in the war when ready.122 There 
was an Anglo-American personal diplomacy of atomic power suggesting some continuity 
with conventional coercion, deterrence and persuasion rather than solely following the moral 
momentum air power acquired in Europe, even if the accent was now overwhelmingly 
American and increasingly looking toward to post-war world. The limited numbers of 
weapons initially available to the Americans placed a coercive nature on their use. The 
deployment of small numbers would not produce national obliteration of the Japanese, but 
graduated destruction aimed at ending the conflict. With the defeat of Germany and the 
looming presence of the Soviet Union, negotiation was therefore an increasingly attractive 
path. Roosevelt and Churchill also at least gave the appearance that they had moral qualms 
about using atomic weapons. They may well have been partly guided by racialized thinking 
in their approach to Japan, but both agreed to use atomic weapons only after ‘mature 
consideration’ in the wording of the September 1944 Anglo-American ‘Aide Memoir.’123 
Such mature consideration ultimately meant Secretary of State Henry Stimson striking Kyoto 
of the USAAF target list because of the potential post-war diplomatic repercussions of 
destroying such an important Japanese cultural centre rather than refraining from using the 
weapons entirely.124 
 
Roosevelt and Churchill also shared a reluctance to announce publicly the existence of 
atomic weapons and technology, indicating a concern with the weapon’s deterrent value. 
Admitting and then sharing information to achieve international control, as directly suggested 
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by scientist Niels Bohr, would assign atomic weaponry a special place outside normal air 
power diplomacy, eliminate the clear American lead and make it useless as a deterrent 
weapon. This was clearly outside the prevailing Anglo-American conception of air power. It 
fell to Truman to inform Stalin of the existence of atomic weapons in July 1945 (though he 
undoubtedly already knew of them via his own intelligence sources). Again, this is suggestive 
of a persuasive element to allied diplomacy and the increasingly tougher line taken by 
Truman in comparison to his predecessor to secure American interests.125 Indeed, Gar 
Alperovitz has argued that the decision to use atomic weapons on Japan was a diplomatic 
move intended to impress their significance on the Soviets.126 In early atomic diplomacy, it 
appeared that both practical and moral concerns re-entered the wartime Anglo-American 
diplomacy. 
 
The Anglo-American personal diplomacy of air power was born in the desire to limit 
armaments. When this failed, first Britain and then the United States reversed their position 
and began to rearm, eventually providing a grand stage for Roosevelt and Churchill to share a 
diplomatic language of air power. Deterrence eventually led to calls for complete ‘command 
of the air’ by the Allies, first with Britain and France as proxies and then through full 
American participation. For Roosevelt, this was no Gen. William Mitchell inspired rapid 
conversion following the Munich Crisis. Instead, like Churchill, he drew on the work of A. T. 
Mahan and a long experience of watching power deployed in international relations.  
 
The decision by the democracies to achieve command of the air had important implications. 
It gave a momentum to the use of air power that set a path to the doctrine of ‘unconditional 
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surrender’ firmly policed at difference times by Roosevelt and Churchill. This transitioned to 
the firebombing of Japan in 1945 and only stopped when changing world relations after the 
defeat of Germany and the nature and numbers of atomic weapons available became 
apparent. Both leaders avoided the moral questions raised at home by the use of air power 
because of the number of civilian casualties (in both enemy and occupied nations), the failure 
to use it to stop atrocities and the bombing of important cultural sites. Arguments of military 
necessity, enemy responsibility and of ‘just war’ provided a shared moral discourse that 
enabled Roosevelt and Churchill to deploy the full diplomatic force of air power.  
 
Despite the personal diplomacy and shared diplomatic language of air power between 
Roosevelt and Churchill, there were clear Anglo-American tensions. Lend-Lease allotments 
allowed the British to specialise in fighter and bomber production, but there was a cost to 
this. The increasing dominance of American aircraft production and air forces gave them a 
powerful voice in British strategy and command appointments. Churchill, more often than 
not, had to defer to the Americans or, as with Greece in late 1944, even request their direct 
help. The complete lack of transport aircraft production left the British particularly vulnerable 
in the coming peace. Tensions burst into the open over American basing requests in the 
Azores and over post-war air routes. Air power now increasingly spoke with an American 
accent as the US conducted its own relations and negotiations that threatened to limit severely 
commercial opportunities for the British. Roosevelt was perfectly willing to use a diplomacy 
of air power and American support of Britain as a tool to persuade and coerce Churchill into 
agreeing to American policy goals. Although Churchill was able to mitigate some of these 
challenges through personal diplomacy, the period marks a distinct transition from British to 





Roosevelt and Churchill’s personal air power diplomacy was certainly useful when it came to 
dealing with Stalin and the Soviet Union. Lend Lease allotments, the strategic bombing of 
Germany and the offer of an air force serving in Soviet territory all served to mitigate Stalin’s 
disappointment with Allied convoy cancellations and delays to the invasion of Europe. 
Although Roosevelt was more hopeful than Churchill was, there were undeniable Allied 
tensions evident with the Soviets that presaged the Cold War. Soviet fears of exposing their 
vulnerabilities to air attack meant operations like VELVET went nowhere and others like 
FRANTIC became frustrating failures. There were also clear limits to Allied air power that 
even Roosevelt appreciated when he steadfastly refused to intervene over Soviet opposition 
to aid to the uprising in Warsaw. This realistic appreciation of the limits of air power, 
grounded in Roosevelt and Churchill’s long experience in international affairs ultimately led 
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